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We propose a new, modal interpretation of questions. The idea of interpreting ques­
tions via modal logic goes back to Hintikka ( 1 976) and Aqvist ( 1965), who inter­
pret a question as a request for knowledge: "bring it about that I know whether . . .  " .  
Such a request i s  composed of an imperative part and an epistemic part. Focusing 
on the latter, we interpret a question as the knowledge condition required in order 
to answer it completely. We will reduce the epistemic part of the meaning of both 
yes-no questions and wh-questions to statements of the form "it is known whether" 
or "it is in the common ground that . . .  ". For instance, for a yes-no question such as 
Is Alice quitting ?, the meaning is "it is known that Alice is quitting or it is known 
that Alice is not quitting" . 
Several different approaches have been suggested in linguistic semantics for 
modeling questions. 
1 .  It is popular to follow Hamblin ( 1973) and Karttunen ( 1 977) (hereafter HK) 
in taking a question to denote its set of partial answers, or partial true an­
swers . For instance, for the wh-question Who 's quitting ?, these would be 
answers of the form: Alice is quitting, or Alice and Bob are quitting. 
2. Groenendijk and Stokhof ( 1 984, 1 996; hereafter GS) propose a more parsi­
monious approach in which the answers in the set are required to be com­
plete and mutually exclusive-in other words, a partition of possible worlds 
in the space of logical possibilities . For the same question, these answers 
would be Nobody is quitting, Just Alice is quitting, etc . 
3 .  In contrast to these firmly intensional question denotations, Nelken and 
Francez (2000, 2002; hereafter NF) propose an extensional interpretation. 
The meaning of the same question is r ("resolved") if it is known for ev­
ery person in the domain whether he or she is quitting. Otherwise, it is ur 
("unresolved") .  
In this paper, we bridge these theories and combine their advantages. We 
begin by presenting the basic approach in Section 2. In Section 3 we delve deeper 
into the denotation of questions. In particular, we address what has been the main 
criticism against similar approaches: how to deal with embedded questions . Our 
theory captures GS 's prized entailment relations among questions and assertions 
(Section 4), while also enjoying an extensional semantics like NF's (Section 5) and 
NF's increased expressive power for complex questions (Section 6). 
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Section 7 shows how our knowledge conditions can encode strongly-ex­
haustive questions, as GS 's partitions can, alongside weakly- and non-exhaustive 
questions, as HK's sets of answers can, and as Beck and Rullmann ( 1 999) call for. 
Section 8 connects our modal perspective to families of subquestions (Beck and 
Sharvit 2002; Sharvit and Beck 200 1 ) . Finally, Section 9 shows that games of in­
terrogation (Groenendijk 1 999) are easily expressed and extended to multi-player 
settings in our approach. 
2. From knowing to asking 
The basic ingredients of our proposal are found in your favorite first-order modal 
logic for knowledge. Take a necessity operator D, which can be read as "it is known 
that" or "it is in the common ground that". Assertions are formulae of the form D¢'. 
For example, for it to be asserted that Alice is quitting is for it to be in the common 
ground that Alice is quitting: DQa. 
We impose only minimal constraints on the logic, summarized in Table 1 .  
First, we require a normal modality to be able to reason with the logic. To use the 
logic as an epistemic one, we require that knowledge of a proposition implies its 
truth. To simplify reasoning, we further assume that the domain remains the same 
as in the real world, even when contemplating epistemic alternatives. 
Constraint 
Normal modality 
Knowledge must be true 
Barcan both ways 
Syntactically Semantically 
Necessitation rule Possible worlds 
and K axiom and accessibility 
T axiom Accessibility is reflexive 
Barcan formula Constant domain 
and its converse 
Table 1 :  Logical constraints 
For concreteness, we assume that the underlying logic is S5,  which is char­
acterized by further validating that accessibility is transitive (the 4 axiom) and sym­
metric (the B axiom)} 
For any formula ¢" we write ?¢' as shorthand for D¢' V D-'¢'. Formulae of this 
form encode yes-no questions. For example, to the question Is Alice quitting ? we 
assign the semantics ?Qa, or DQa V D-.Qa. The intuition behind this assignment 
is that to know whether Alice is quitting is to either know that she is or know that 
she is not. Thus, we directly encode the meaning of the question as its knowledge 
condition-what it takes to know a complete answer to the question. The inten­
sional semantics of such formulae is the standard Kripke semantics. The meaning 
of DQa V D-.Qa is that all the possible worlds seen from the current one agree on 
Qa. In other words, Qa is either uniformly true in all these worlds, or uniformly 
false in all of them. 
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Similarly, we encode wh-questions as formulae of the form ?1. r/J, which is 
shorthand for V 1. ?r/J, where 1 is one or more variables. For example, we take the 
meaning of Who is quitting ? to be Vx. oQx V o.., Qx. The intuition here is that to 
know who is quitting is to know for each person whether he or she is quitting. The 
intensional semantics is that all the worlds seen from the current world agree on the 
extension of Q-the set of people who quit must be the same in all the worlds. This 
approach is strongly exhaustive; we will refine this assumption in Section 7 .  
3 .  Question denotations 
The main linguistic objection to reducing questions to knowledge conditions is that 
it seems to take knowledge as an integral part of the question meaning. This would 
seem to preclude treating embedding verbs like wonder and depend on. Moreover, 
it does not seem to distinguish between the speech acts of asking a question and 
asserting knowledge of the question's answer. 
To address this objection, it is important to note that the modality 0 in a 
formula like o Qa V o..,Qa refers to the knowledge state of no particular agent or 
group. Neither does 0 quantify universally over all possible worlds in intensional 
logic. Rather, 0 is just an abstract modality. By slight abuse of notation, it is 
perhaps more accurate to say that Is Alice quitting ? and whether Alice is quitting 
both denote the abstraction 
( 1 )  AD. oQa V o..,Qa, 
in which 0 is bound by a lambda operator. We shall shortly explain the added AD 
model-theoretically. We posit that questions "start their life" in semantic compo­
sition with this abstraction in place. To finalize a sentence meaning, this function 
must be applied to some epistemic modality, in other words, to some knowledge 
state. Performing a matrix question applies the abstraction to the implicit conversa­
tional common ground Dca. Likewise, a question-embedding verb such as know or 
wonder applies the same abstraction to other knowledge states. Thus, if to wonder 
is to want to know, then wonder denotes 
(2) Aq. Ax. 'x wants that q(ox)' , 
where Ox is the knowledge state of x in an alternative world, and q(ox) is the propo­
sition that x knows (the answer to) q. 
What does it mean for a function to take a modality as argument? A modal­
ity is specified by its accessibility relation, so we could simply say that a question 
meaning takes an accessibility relation as argument. Questions would then be of 
type «s, (s, t», ( s, t»: functions from accessibility relations to propositions. 
But we can simplify this type using our requirements on the accessibility 
relation. Because accessibility is transitive and symmetric in S5 ,  and the truth value 
of a modal formula only depends on worlds at least indirectly accessible, we can 
simplify the first argument to questions from an accessibility relation to a set of 
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accessible worlds . Questions are then of type « s, t), (s ,  t», so that q(W)(w) holds 
just in case the set of worlds W agree on the complete answer to q at the world w. In 
other words, q(W)(w) holds if knowing that the actual world is in W entails knowing 
the complete answer to q at w. Because accessibility is reflexive by assumption, 
q(W)(w) need only be defined when W contains w. 
All questions on our account are monotonic: it never hurts to know more. 
Formally, if q is a question, then q(WI )(w) implies q(W2)(w) whenever WI is a 
superset of W2 • 
4. Entailment relations 
GS describe two entailment relations involving questions that any theoretical treat­
ment of the semantics of questions should provide . Answerhood is the relation 
between a question and each of its possible answers . Interrogative entailment is 
a relation between questions. One question is said to entail another if knowing a 
complete answer to the first entails knowing a complete answer to the second. As 
with NF's theory of questions, both these relations (as well as ordinary indicative 
entailment) reduce to (modal) consequence: ¢J F 1/1. (That is, if ¢J holds in every 
world, then 1/1 holds in every world.) 
Here are a few example answerhood entailments. Assuming the domain 
consists of the two individuals Alice (a) and Bob (b), we have the entailment: 
(3) Alice is quitting and Bob isn 't quitting answers Who is quitting ? 
which can be written: 
(4) Qa /\ o Qb F ?x. Qx. 
This entailment is easily verifiable: if the left hand side is true in all possible worlds, 
then all worlds agree on the extension of Q, and hence the right hand side is also 
true. 
The strongly exhaustive nature of the semantics becomes apparent when we 
consider a negative answerhood example such as 
(5) 3x. Qx � ?x. Qx. 
Clearly, the left hand side may be true in all possible worlds but using a different 
witness for the existential quantification in different worlds, thus falsifying the right 
hand side. 
A question such as 
(6) Is it either raining or not raining ? 
is trivial ,  in the sense that it does not impose any extra knowledge conditions : 
(7) F ?(R v oR) . 
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Interrogative entailment is also straightforward, as illustrated by the follow­
ing examples. 
(8) Who is quitting ? entails Who is not quitting ? 
which can be written: 
(9) ?x. Qx F ?x . ..,Qx. 
In fact, both questions are equivalent, as they have the same knowledge conditions. 
An example where entailment does not hold is: 
( 10) Who is quitting and moving away ? does not entail Who is not quitting ? 
since we may know the complete answer to the former question and yet not know 
the complete answer to the latter one. 
( 1 1 )  ?x. Qx 1\ Mx IF ?x . ..,Qx 
The examples above illustrate the empirical adequacy of the theory. In fact, 
we formally prove in forthcoming work that the entailment relations of GS are ex­
actly preserved. This is a welcome result, since it shows that we can achieve GS 's 
explanatory power using a much simpler semantics (in fact, an extensional one, as 
described in Section 5). The intuition behind the proof is as follows. On the GS ap­
proach, a question partitions logical space into equivalence classes, corresponding 
to the possible answers of the question. On our approach, in each possible world 
w we assign the question the value "true" iff all the worlds accessible from w (that 
is, all the worlds compatible with the agent's  knowledge) agree on the answer. In 
other words, for each possible world, an agent may entertain only epistemic possi­
bilities that are homogeneous with respect to the answer to the question. Thus, for a 
question to be resolved, the knowledge relation should respect the partition bound­
aries .  This yields an exact correspondence between the GS partition interpretation 
of questions and our new modal interpretation. 
By assigning truth values (of modal formulae) to questions, we gain the sim­
plicity of NF's analysis: a uniform consequence relation that includes indicative en­
tailment, answerhood, and interrogative entailment as particular instances . We also 
gain expressive power with which to account for more complex questions, as ex­
plained in Section 6.  Another advantage of our modal perspective is that established 
techniques of modal logic are immediately available for reasoning about questions .  
In particular, we can apply inference procedures for modal logic to answerhood, ex­
tending ten Cate and Shan's (2002) question-answering algorithm for GS 's  partition 
semantics to any question meanings encoded as knowledge conditions . In fact, we 
can directly use Cerrito and Cialdea Mayer's (200 1 )  proof procedure for first-order 
S4 logic. The procedure is sound and complete-given a question, it generates only 
and all answers. However, as one might expect, it does not always terminate-in 
some cases, there is an infinite number of possible answers, and no answer is most 
informative. 
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5. Extensional semantics 
Both HK and GS take a question to mean its answers. Because answers are proposi­
tions, such an approach inherently attributes the added complexity of intensionality 
to interrogative sentences, but not to indicative sentences. While there may be good 
reasons to adopt such an asymmetry, it is less clear what level of intensionality is 
actually necessary to interpret questions. To examine this issue, we propose to try 
to construct an extensional semantics of questions, and see how far one can take it. 
Even if intensionality turns out to be necessary in the end, we will better understand 
what phenomena in the interpretation of questions really overstep the extensional 
boundary and drive the need for intensionality. 
NF propose an explicitly extensional interpretation of questions.  They ex­
tend the domain of truth values from 2 values to 5, organized in a bilattice along two 
dimensions : truth and resolvedness.2 Both indicative and interrogative sentences 
are assigned values from this 5-element set. Indicative sentences are assigned one 
of three truth values, t, f and uk (unknown). Interrogative sentences are assigned 
one of two resolvedness values, r (resolved) and ur (unresolved), depending on the 
truth value of the underlying indicative sentence: 
(12) ?Qa = 
{r if Qa E If, t} 
ur otherwise 
(13) ?x. Qx = 
{r if Qx E If, t} for all values of x 
ur otherwise 
Of the 5 values, the values t and r are designated. Entailment is defined to hold be­
tween two formulae if whenever the first formula is assigned a designated value, so 
is the second. This notion of entailment uniformly accounts for the different kinds 
of entailment (indicative, answerhood, and interrogative), and correctly predicts a 
wide range of empirical entailments. The NF approach can be seen as a particular 
interpretation of modal formulae over a domain of five values .  The 0 operator is 
just a mapping from the indicative values to the interrogative ones, mapping f and 
t to r, and uk to ur. 
Unfortunately, the bilattice interpretation is not entirely empirically accu­
rate. For instance, (6) is erroneously not predicted to be a trivial question using 
the bilattice approach; in other words, the entailment (7) should be valid but is 
not (Nelken and Francez 2002). This failure would appear to cast into doubt the 
empirical adequacy of interpreting questions extensionally. 
Fortunately, our modal approach offers a new extensional interpretation of 
questions that preserves GS 's entailment relations (and thus correctly validates (7» . 
Recall that propositional modal logic has the finite-model property: if a collection 
of formulae has a model, then it has a model with a finite number of possible worlds. 
This useful property does not hold in general for first-order modal (predicate) logic . 
However, we show in forthcoming work that the finite-model property does hold 
if we restrict ourselves to first-order modal formulae that encode questions. The 
main reason is that the modal depth (roughly, the maximum number of D-nesting 
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levels) of these formulae is bounded. In fact, because the modal depth is at most 1 
(in other words, we never nest one 0 under another in order to encode questions), 
even two worlds are enough. More precisely, any entailment that we encounter 
while interpreting questions is satisfiable iff it is satisfiable with two worlds, and 
falsifiable iff it is falsifiable with two worlds . 
We can use this result to provide a novel extensional interpretation which 
exactly preserves the entailment relations of as. We can straightforwardly simulate 
a two-world structure using a regular (non-modal) first-order model, by using 4 
truth values: {FF, T F, FT, TT} . In this model, each atomic formula is assigned one 
of these four values. The truth value of more complex formulae is computed by 
applying the regular truth tables of the logical operators in a point-wise fashion. 
In particular, ? computes the consensus between the two worlds : it maps TT and 
FF to TT; and TF and FT to FF. The double truth values thus simulate the two 
worlds. We illustrate this simulation with an example.  Consider once again (7), 
repeated here: 
( 14) F ?(R V ...,R). 
Since the logical operators operate point-wise, R V ...,R is TT regardless of the truth 
value of R. Thus ?(R V ...,R) is TT, so the entailment holds in this 4-value logic, as 
desired. 
This novel extensional interpretation nevertheless has a certain intensional 
flavor, in that the 4 truth values simply encode two possible worlds. This flavor 
raises a more philosophical issue regarding what constitutes an extensional seman­
tics .  On one hand, if we forget about the possible worlds and just use a non-classical 
handful of truth values, would our semantics appear more extensional? On the other 
hand, if we had to encode more possible worlds, say 20 instead of 2, yielding an 
astronomical number of truth values, would the interpretation still qualify as exten­
sional? Is intensionality a binary decision or is it a matter of degree? 
6. Internalized questions 
Because we let questions denote their knowledge conditions, which are just modal 
formulae, they can further combine with other formulae. In particular, our ? op­
erator is internalized: as in NF's but not as 's analysis, it can apply anywhere 
in a question meaning, not just at the top level or under some top-level universal 
quantifiers. We can thus handle the following constructions using standard logical 
connectives. 
Conjunction Do you have a license and who (else) has one ? (? L 1\ ? x. Lx). 
Disjunction What 's your social security number? Or what 's your mother's maiden 
name ? (?x. S x  V ?x. Mx). Is it getting wanner? Or is it just me ? Whereas 
conjunction is straightforward for as, they get disjunction only by resort­
ing to higher-order type-shifting from partitions to sets of sets of partitions, 
getting a highly complex object. 
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Conditional lf it 's raining, may I borrow your umbrella ? (R -+ ?U). These ques­
tions are unavailable for GS . 
Universal quantification Who recommends each candidate ? (Vy. Cy -+ ?x. Rxy). 
In previous theories, because questions are not propositions, they are diffi­
cult to quantify over. For instance, Karttunen uses double negation to get 
these readings. Since conditional questions are unavailable for GS, so is 
universal quantification over conditional questions. 
Also by universally quantifying over conditional questions, we can express 
the contrast between de dicto and de re readings of which-questions (Groe­
nendijk and Stokhof 1984), as in Alice just discovered which spies are quit­
ting. The de dicto reading here (Vx. S x-+ ?Qx) neither entails nor is entailed 
by the de re reading (Vx. ?(S x /I. Qx)). 
The fact that our logic allows these constructions straightforwardly, whereas 
HK and GS struggle to get them, if they get them at all , raises an important method­
ological issue. There are well-known restrictions on what operators and quantifiers 
can scope over questions. For instance, one cannot negate questions, and only the 
universal quantifier can robustly scope over questions. Likewise, while conditional 
questions are clearly available, there is some debate in the literature over the empir­
ical acceptability of disjunctions over questions. Szabolcsi ( 1 997) claims that they 
are unavailable, whereas GS and NF accept them. 
Clearly, a fully adequate theory of questions, be it of syntactic interroga­
tives or semantic information requests, should predict all and only the available 
constructions. HK and GS start off with a relatively complicated system that under­
generates, then apply additional operations that are usually not externally motivated, 
like higher-order type-shifting, to generate (some) more complex constructions. Of 
course, for the empirically unavailable combinations (such as negated questions) 
these theories can simply remain silent, but the empirically available combinations 
(such as conditional questions) necessitate complications. By contrast, our modal 
approach over-generates, so we have to impose additional restrictions in order to 
rule out the unacceptable constructions-not a difficult task, but stipulative still . 
We find a logic like ours valuable, in which these unavailable combinations 
can at least be encoded alongside available ones for discussion. This allows us to 
reason about the unavailable combinations without descending into formal gibber­
ish. For instance, we can ask why a particular construction cannot make a particular 
information request, hence providing some explanation for why the corresponding 
natural language sentences would be ungrammatical .  For reasoning along these 
lines, see NF's speculative discussion of why negation and downward-monotone 
quantification over questions are unavailable. 
7. Exhaustive questions versus complete answers 
If an assertion ¢J entails a question t/I, then we say that ¢J is a complete answer to t/I. 
For example, asserting that it is raining and nobody is quitting (o(R /I. Vx. -,Qx)) 
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completely answers the question who is quitting (?x . Qx). 
Completeness relates answers to questions; exhaustivity is a separate no­
tion that applies to wh-questions only. The encoding of wh-questions that we have 
presented so far-as formulae of the form Vx. ?¢>--is strongly exhaustive in that it 
universally quantifies over X. To know who is quitting in this sense is to know for 
each person x either that x is quitting or that x is not. By contrast, to know who is 
quitting in the weakly exhaustive sense is to know, for each person x who is quitting, 
that x is quitting: Vx. Qx -+ oQx, or more generally Vx. ¢ -+ o¢. Finally, a question 
like where a gas station is, in an appropriately desperate situation, is non-exhaustive 
and would be represented by existential quantification: 3x. oGx. Any assertion of 
a gas station's location qualifies as a complete answer. 
Van Rooy (2003) offers to view the difference between exhaustive and non­
exhaustive questions not as ambiguity but rather as underspecification. 3  He assigns 
to questions a uniform meaning regardless of whether they are exhaustive or not, 
namely a family of (potentially overlapping) sets of possible worlds . These sets are 
determined in accordance with the optimal answers to the asker's  decision problem, 
the one that motivated asking the question in the first place. This approach has the 
advantage of unifying questions of different exhaustivity levels.  However, it does 
so at the price of introducing additional notions having to do with the speaker's  
hidden mental state (such as the underlying decision problem, and a notion of the 
optimal utility of answers). Our knowledge conditions can be thought to encode the 
utility of an answer as a binary value : either useful (that is, entailing the knowledge 
condition) or not. 
It is technically possible to reformulate van Rooy's approach in our terms 
by dividing a subset of the domain (consisting of those elements that are relevant 
according to van Rooy) into a family S of possibly overlapping subsets. Intuitively, 
these are the subsets of equal utility for the asker. The meaning of a question then re­
mains universal quantification, but with an added existential quantification over the 
subsets in S. For instance, Where can I get gas ? becomes: 3D' E S. V x E D' . oGx. 
The exhaustive case is when S consists of a single set: the domain. The non­
exhaustive case is when S is a full partition of the domain into singletons .  Pre­
sumably, S can be determined by the same methods as van Rooy determines his 
division of the set of possible worlds .  
Any strongly-exhaustive question Vx. ?¢ can be recast as the weakly-ex­
haustive question 
( 15) Vx. Vy. (y = ¢) -+ o(y = ¢) 
(in which the variable y ranges over truth values), because both questions are equiv­
alent to 
( 16) Vx. (¢ -+ o¢) A (...,¢ -+ o...,¢) . 
We can characterize the difference between strongly-, weakly-, and non­
exhaustive questions semantically, as follows. Exhaustive questions are additive : 
if q is an exhaustive question, then q(W1 )(w) A q(W2)(w) implies q(WI U W2)(w), 
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and similarly for infinite unions. In words, a disjunction of complete answers is 
still a complete answer. Non-exhaustive questions are not additive: Where can I get 
gas ? is completely answered by both in Central Square and in Inman Square, but 
not by in either Central Square or Inman Square; I 'm not sure which. Strongly­
exhaustive questions are not only additive but also constant across worlds .  That is, 
q(W)(wI ) = q(W)(W2), if q is strongly exhaustive, and WI and W2 are worlds in W. 
Let q be an additive question denotation. Following Heim's  terminology 
( 1994), we define the answer} of q at a world w, written A�(q), to be the union of 
all world-sets W satisfying q(W)(w). The additivity of q ensures that the answerl is 
itself an answer, in that q(A�(q» (w) is true. Because q is monotonic, q(W)(w) is true 
just in case W is a subset of A�(q). Thus q is determined by A�(q) at each world w, 
and we are tempted to simplify the semantic type of exhaustive questions from 
«s, t), (s, t» to (s, (s, t» : given a world w, return the answer! A�(q) at w. However, 
this simplification only works for exhaustive questions. Beck and Rullmann ( 1999; 
Section 7 . 1 )  hence argue that a question must sometimes denote a set of answer 
propositions, rather than always denoting its answer! proposition. By contrast, our 
question denotations handle strongly-, weakly-, and non-exhaustive questions all at 
the same type, namely «s, t), (s, t». 
8. Plurality of questions 
As explained above, we interpret a wh-question by universally quantifying over 
individual questions .  This strategy has a strong connection to Beck and Sharvit's 
work (2002; Sharvit and Beck 2001 )  on families of subquestions for explaining 
quantificational variability effects. On Beck and Sharvit's analysis, sentences like 
( 17) Alice mostly knows who is quitting. 
( 1 8) With few exceptions, Alice knows who is quitting. 
quantify over a contextually salient family of subquestions of the question who is 
quitting. A family of subquestions is simply a set of questions, satisfying some 
conditions detailed below. For example, the family S of subquestions might be 
( 19) { is Alice quitting, is Bob quitting, is Carol quitting, . . .  } ,  
and the sentences ( 1 7) and ( 1 8) mean 
(20) For most questions s in S ,  Alice knows s. 
(2 1 )  For all but few questions s in S ,  Alice knows s. 
Beck and Sharvit argue that these sentences quantify over not persons or 
propositions but questions. Leaving these arguments aside, we show here how our 
modal perspective expresses their proposal, so as to generalize it to weakly- and 
non-exhaustive questions as introduced in Section 7 .  
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It is tempting to view the wh-question formula ?x. ¢J as explicitly encoding 
the set of questions { ?¢[J/XJ I J E Dn }, where D is the domain and x consists of 
n variables. Indeed, this set is a family of subquestions, used in the simplest cases 
of quantificational variability, such as those above. But as Beck and Sharvit show, 
this set sometimes differs from the contextually salient family of subquestions. To 
allow for these cases, Beck and Sharvit propose that any set S of questions can be 
used as the family of subquestions of a question q, as long as the following three 
criteria are satisfied. 
1 .  Answering every question in S would answer q as well . 
2. Every question s in S is a subquestion of q. Formally, if s and q both denote 
partitions of the set of possible worlds into classes, then there is some class 
of s that is disjoint from some class of q. In other words, there are two 
possible worlds Ws and Wq such that the partition according to s containing 
Ws is disjoint from the partition according to q containing wq •
4 Note that, 
despite the terminology, being a subquestion is a symmetric relation. 
3. No proper subset of S satisfies these two criteria. 
The second criterion above mentions partitions: Beck and Sharvit only con­
sider strongly exhaustive questions, which they follow GS in treating as partitions 
of the set of possible worlds . However, the family of subquestions approach is ap­
plicable not only to strongly-exhaustive questions but also to weakly- and even (un­
der certain conditions) non-exhaustive questions. Since partitions cannot be used 
to model weakly- and non-exhaustive questions, we must reformulate the second 
criterion using only knowledge conditions. Instead of referring to the partitions 
containing W s and W q' we can look at an answer to s in W s and an answer to q 
in wq• These answers must be disjoint, that is, mutually exclusive . This yields the 
following formulation. 
1 .  The conjunction of all questions in S entails q. 
2. Every question s in S is a subquestion of q, in the sense that there exist two 
possible worlds Ws and wq, such that any two propositions Ws and Wq are 
mutually exclusive whenever they answer s and q at Ws and wq, respectively. 
In other words, for s and q to be subquestions of each other is for there to 
be worlds Ws and wq, such that any two world-sets Ws and Wq are disjoint 
whenever s(Ws)(ws) and q(Wq)(Wq) are both true.s 
3 .  No proper subset of S satisfies these two criteria. 
This reformulation has the virtue of being applicable even when the partition se­
mantics of questions is not. 
Despite this reformulation, non-exhaustive questions cannot ordinarily be 
interpreted as a family of subquestions, as reflected by their distinct (existential) 
representation. For example, if Alice knows the exact location of even a single gas 
station, then Alice knows exactly where to get gas. If Alice runs out of gas while 
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driving, and she asks Bob whether he knows where to get gas, it would be odd for 
Bob to answer with few exceptions, I do, even if Bob knows the exact locations of 
all but a few gas stations in the area. This oddity is because no discrete family of 
subquestions is contextually salient. Bob could say I mostly do, not to mean that he 
knows the locations of most gas stations nearby, but to mean that he has somewhat 
vague recollections of how to navigate to a certain gas station nearby. The relevant 
family of subquestions here is how to navigate at each step. 
9. Multi-party conversations 
Because the partition theory of questions embeds into our semantics, we can recast 
Groenendijk's game of interrogation ( 1999) in our terms. In Groenendijk's origi­
nal game, an interrogator and a witness take turns asking questions and asserting 
answers. The interrogator must not ask superfluous questions;  for example, having 
asked Who is quitting ?, the interrogator must not ask Who is not quitting ? because 
of the entailment (8) above. The witness must not make irrelevant assertions; for 
example, having been asked Who is quitting and moving away ?, the witness must 
not assert Alice is not quitting because of the non-entailment ( 10) above. (The wit­
ness must also avoid assertions that are redundant, meaning entailed by the common 
ground, or incredible, meaning inconsistent with the common ground.) From the 
modal perspective, we can extend this game from one interrogator and one witness 
to mUltiple, overlapping groups of participants. 
Groenendijk keeps track of the knowledge and issues in the current common 
ground in a context C, which is a partial equivalence relation over possible worlds, 
or equivalently, a partition of a subset of the set of possible worlds. A world ap­
pears in the context just in case it is not yet ruled out by the knowledge state in 
the common ground; two worlds are related by the context just in case it is not yet 
under discussion which one is real . In Groenendijk's game, the only knowledge 
state and knowledge conditions relevant to felicity in the conversation is the com­
mon ground between the interrogator and the witness. We can generalize this to 
knowledge state and knowledge conditions among overlapping groups by keeping 
track of one context per group. That is, for every group of participants G, we keep 
track of a context CG for that group, still a partial equivalence relation over worlds . 
Entailment among contexts respects containment among groups ;  that is, if G' � G, 
then CG, � CG throughout our generalized game. 
Groenendijk's interrogator updates the context by removing equivalences ; 
his witness updates the contexts by removing worlds. For a question q (denoting a 
partition of worlds) to be non-redundant is for the context C to not entail q. For an 
assertion ¢J (denoting a set of worlds) to be relevant is for the context C to entail ?¢J, 
where ?¢J is the binary partition of worlds formed by ¢J and its complement -.¢J. 
In our generalization, the group G of participants in the room can change from 
move to move. A question still removes equivalences, and an answer still removes 
worlds, but from every context CG, for subgroups G' of G. (It is easy to check 
that this update procedure preserves the invariant that entailment among contexts 
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respects containment among groups.) Each question q must not be redundant: CG 
better not entail q. (Because of the invariant, then, it never hurts to ask a question 
in a bigger group. For example, the same question may be asked again after a 
participant enters, but not leaves, the room.) Each answer ¢ must be relevant: CG 
better entail ?¢. (Because of the invariant, it never hurts to assert an answer in a 
smaller group--except the assertion may then be redundant or incredible.) 
The generalization just described of Groenendijk's game may seem straight­
forward at first glance, and to the extent that it is straightforward, the link that this 
paper makes between question meanings and knowledge conditions is successful . 
However, we must point out two caveats that call for future work. 
First and foremost, neither Groenendijk's nor our game deals with questions 
that are not strongly exhaustive. The problem lies with the licensing condition for 
answers : according to Groenendijk, an answer ¢ is relevant to assert just in case 
the context entails ?¢. But if a question 1/1 is under discussion that is weakly- or 
non-exhaustive, then even a complete answer ¢ to 1/1 (that is, so that o¢ F= 1/1) is con­
sidered irrelevant (that is, 1/1 IF ?¢) ! This wrongly prevents any answer to a question 
like Where can I get gas ? Hence this relevance criterion must be revised for non­
strongly-exhaustive questions .  Invoking the notion of subquestions, perhaps one 
could err on the side of permissiveness and allow any answer ¢ to be asserted as 
long as o¢ completely answers any subquestion in any family of subquestions of 1/1. 
Second, as we consider more complex games of interrogation, it becomes 
less clear that our formal criteria for redundancy and relevance really correspond to 
intuitive notions. In what sense do participants in these games know what issues are 
under discussion, and work towards the goal of resolving these issues? Not in any 
sense so far formally related to logics for epistemic actions. Grounding games of 
interrogation like ours, in logics for epistemic actions such as Baltag et al . ' s  ( 1 999), 
would help model subtleties such as the following. Suppose that Alice asks Bob and 
Carol whether it is raining, then Bob leaves the room. Is it still relevant for Carol 
to tell Alice that it is raining? This assertion does not further common knowledge 
among Alice, Bob, and Carol, yet our generalized game above allows it. 
Endnotes 
1 .  For completeness, here i s  the list of axioms: 
Necessitation If ¢ is provable with no assumption, then so is o¢. 
K o(¢ --+ 1/1) --+ o¢ --+ 01/1. 
The T axiom o¢ --+ ¢. 
Barcan both ways (oVx. ¢) H (Vx. o¢). 
The 4 axiom o¢ --+ oo¢; 
The B axiom ¢ --+ o..,o..,¢. 
2. A bilattice is a set that is simultaneously ordered by two partial orders . 
3 .  We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for directing our attention to this 
point. 
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4. If, to the contrary, every partition of s intersects every partition of q, then s 
and q are unrelated questions. 
5 .  Recall that, if q is a question, W is a set of worlds, and w is a world, then 
q(W)(w) holds if knowing that the actual world is in W entails knowing the complete 
answer to q at w. 
* We thank Nissim Francez, Stuart Shieber, the anonymous reviewers and the 
participants of the SALT 14  conference for their suggestions and comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
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